Quantum cryptographic three party protocols by Mueller-Quade, J. & Imai, H.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
00
10
11
1v
1 
 3
1 
O
ct
 2
00
0
Quantum cryptographic three party protocols
J. Mu¨ller-Quade and H. Imai
Imai Laboratory, Institute of Industrial Science, The University of Tokyo
(October 31st, 2000)
Due to the impossibility results of Mayers and Lo/Chau it
is generally thought that a quantum channel is cryptograph-
ically strictly weaker than oblivious transfer.
In this paper we prove that in a three party scenario a quan-
tum channel can be strictly stronger than oblivious transfer.
With the protocol introduced in this paper we can completely
classify the cryptographic strength of quantum multi party
protocols.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In a multi party protocol a set P of players wants
to correctly compute a function f(a1, . . . , an) which de-
pends on secret inputs of n players. Some players might
collude to cheat in the protocol as to obtain information
about secret inputs of the other players or to modify the
result of the computation. Possible collusions of cheaters
are modelled by adversary structures
Definition 1 An adversary structure is a monotone set
A ⊆ 2P , i. e., for subsets S′ ⊆ S of P the property S ∈ A
implies S′ ∈ A.
The main properties of a multi party protocol are:
1. A multi party protocol is said to be A-secure if no single
collusion from A is able to obtain information about the
secret inputs of other participants which cannot be derived
from the result and the inputs of the colluding players.
2. A multi party protocol is A-partially correct if no possible
collusion can let the protocol terminate with a wrong result.
3. A multi party protocol is called A-fair if no collusion from
A can reconstruct the result of the multi party computation
earlier then all honest participants together. No collusion
should be able to run off with the result.
We will be more strict here and demand robustness
even against disruptors.
2’ A multi party protocol is A-correct whenever no single col-
lusion from A can abort the protocol, modify its result, or
take actions such that some player gets to know a secret
value.
A protocol is called A-robust if it has all of the above
properties. Note that we will allow only one collusion
to cheat, but we think of every single player as being
curious, i. e., even if he is not in the collusion actually
cheating he will eavesdrop all information he can obtain
without being detected cheating
With oblivious transfer all multi party protocols can
be realized with perfect security if all players are coop-
erating [2,6,4]. But a collusion of players can abort the
calculation, see next section.
Classically one can avoid this problem only by intro-
ducing a new cryptographic primitive which is more pow-
erful than oblivious transfer [12,5].
This paper analyzes three party quantum protocols
and how they can cope with the problem of disruption.
We prove that there are situations where a quantum
channel is strictly more powerful than oblivious trans-
fer. Together with the results of [10,8,7] we can conclude
that the cryptographic power of a quantum channel is
uncomparable to the power of oblivious transfer.
II. IMPOSSIBILITY OF CLASSICAL THREE
PARTY PROTOCOLS
To clearly show the advantage of quantum protocols
we restate the following impossibility result of [1].
Lemma 2 Let P be a set of players for which each pair
of players is connected by a (private) oblivious transfer
channel and each player has access to an authenticated
broadcast channel. Then A-robust multi party computa-
tions are possible for all functions if and only if no two
sets of A cover P \ {Pi} for a player Pi ∈ P or |P | = 2.
The basic idea to prove this impossibility result of [1]
is to have two possible collusions A1, A2 covering P \{Pi}
(for a player Pi) where either all players from A1 or all
players from A2 refuse to cooperate with the players of
the other possible collusion. Then the single player Pi
has to assist all other players. In [1] it is proven that one
cannot avoid that the player Pi learns a secret.
Especially three party protocols cannot necessarily be
realized robustly if every player is possibly cheating.
III. THREE PARTY PROTOCOLS
If all players in a three party protocol cooperate we can
use the protocols of [11] to implement A-robust quantum
multi party protocols. Hence we focus on the situation
where three players (Alice, Bob, and Helen) want to per-
form three party protocols and Alice and Bob are in con-
flict. One of the two is refusing to cooperate with the
other and it is unclear for Helen who is cheating.
As a first step we will introduce a bit commitment pro-
tocol for Alice and Bob. The idea is that Alice sends her
quantum states via Helen and Bob does not know which
quantum data is coming from Helen and which data is
just forwarded by Helen. Hence Bob cannot complain
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without reason or he risks to be detected cheating by He-
len. Forwarding information as if it were ones own with-
out being able to eavesdrop is impossible classically. One
further advantage of the protocol below is that Alice can
forward all information via Helen and Bob cannot know
whose information it is: An anonymous quantum chan-
nel. This way Bob cannot distinguish between commit-
ments of Alice and “pretended” commitments of Helen.
Later we want to follow this idea with larger protocols
containing this bit commitment protocol as a subproto-
col. Then we let Alice forward all her information via
Helen.
Commit(b)
FOR i ∈ {1, . . . , l} DO
1. Alice gives a random string r of qubits encoded in random
bases s ∈ {+,×} to Helen.
2. Helen sends a substring to Bob interleaved with quantum
states of her own. Helen tells Alice which quantum states are
hers without revealing information about which substring
she forwarded.
3. Bob announces to have received all quantum states. With a
probability of 1/2 he publishes all his measurement results.
4. Alice opens to Helen the bases she used. Now Alice is bound
to the parity bit of r.
OD
5 Alice is now bound to the Xor of all quantum states (which
were not measured and published by Bob) Alice announces
(via Helen if needed) if this parity bit is equal to the bit b
she originally wanted to commit to.
Unveil
1. Alice opens (via Helen if necessary) all choices she made.
2. Helen and Bob check consistency.
Lemma 3 For A = {{Alice}, {Bob}, {Helen}} the
above protocol realizes an A-robust bit commitment for
Alice which binds her to Bob and to Helen even if Alice
and Bob are in conflict.
Proof: We say the protocol has failed if many of the
quantum states measured and published by Bob do not
match what Alice sent or what Helen sent. If there are
only very few cases with discrepancies the protocol is
considered a success.
If the protocol does not fail then the protocol is con-
cealing to Helen. Helen has sent some substrings to Bob
and as she could not know which substrings would be
measured and published by Bob there are some sub-
strings which she forwarded, but which were not tested.
Hence Helen cannot measure the overall parity bit b even
after getting to know the bases. Helen cannot measure
before getting to know the bases as she will be detected
cheating whenever Bob measures and publishes a quan-
tum state she disturbed.
If the protocol did not fail it is concealing to Bob unless
Helen and Bob collude. This is clear as Bob does not have
the complete quantum state, and can hence not measure
the parity bit.
If the protocol did not fail it is binding for Alice unless
she colludes with Helen, which is impossible according to
our assumption.
If the protocol failed there are two cases to be consid-
ered. First, Bob published a lot of measurement results
which do not match what Alice sent, but Helen was not
complaining about Bob, then it is clear for Alice that He-
len and Bob collude somehow, but as this is not possible
according to our assumption this will not happen. The
second case is that Helen complains about Bob, then Bob
is identified as a cheater as every player complains about
Bob. ✷
As Alice is by the above protocol bound to Bob and
Helen we have bit commitment from Alice to Bob and
from Alice to Helen and from Bob to Alice and from
Bob to Helen. As the quantum channel between Alice
and Helen and between Bob and Helen is working we
even have oblivious transfer from Helen to Alice and from
Helen to Bob by forcing honest measurements with bit
commitment [13].
Corollary 4 The above sketched oblivious transfer pro-
tocol between Alice and Helen and between Bob and He-
len is A-robust and becomes A˜-robust after it termi-
nated for A = {{Alice}, {Bob}, {Helen}} and A˜ =
{{Alice, Bob}, {Helen}}.
Proof: The bit commitment used for forcing measur-
ments need only be shortly binding. It need only be
binding until the honest measurement is performed unre-
versibly. Hence the collusion {Alice, Bob}, which would
be able to violate the binding condition but not the con-
cealing condition of the above bit commitment, cannot
cheat after the measurement is performed. ✷
Next we have to define some notions which are impor-
tant for multi party protocols. Details can be looked up
in [4].
Definition 5 A bit commitment with Xor (BCX) to a
bit b is a commitment to bits b1L, b2L, . . . , bmL, b1R, . . . ,
bmR such that for each i biL ⊕ biR = b.
The following result about zero knowledge proofs on
BCX can be found in [4] and in references therein.
Theorem 6 Bit commitments with Xor allow zero
knowledge proofs of linear relations among several bits
a player has committed to using BCX. Especially
(in)equality of bits or a bit string being contained in a
linear code.
Furthermore BCXs can be copied, as proofs may de-
stroy a BCX.
In a multi party scenario it is necessary that a player
should be committed to all other players. In our three
party case this is given by our bit commitment protocol
which binds one player (Alice or Bob) to the other two.
For Helen the following global bit commitment with Xor
can be implemented by Corollary 4 and the techniques
used in [4] as she is not in conflict with anyone.
2
Definition 7 A global bit commitment with Xor
(GBCX) is a BCX commitment from a player Alice ∈ P
to all other players such that all players are convinced
that Alice did commit to the same bit in all the different
BCX.
Corollary 8 Zero knowledge proofs of linear relations
among several GBCX are possible. Furthermore GBCX
can be copied by copying the individual BCX.
On these commitments operates the committed oblivi-
ous transfer protocol, defined in [4] which forms the basis
of our multi party protocols.
Definition 9 Given two players Alice and Bob where Al-
ice is committed to bits b0, b1 and Bob is committed to
a bit a. Then a committed oblivious transfer protocol
(COT) is a protocol where Alice inputs her knowledge
about her two commitments and Bob will input his knowl-
edge about his commitment and the result will be that Bob
is committed to ba.
In a global committed oblivious transfer protocol all
players are convinced of the validity of the commitments,
i.e., that indeed Bob is committed to ba after the protocol.
As Helen is not actively cheating by assumption and
Alice or Bob cannot complain about Helen without being
expelled from the protocol we can realize GCOT from
Helen to Alice and from Helen to Bob by following the
protocol of [4]. To realize GCOT from Alice to Bob is
more difficult. We will do this in two steps. First we
realize a subprotocol which we call subGCOT and second
we will observe that all other steps can be realized easily
once one round of subGCOT was successfull.
To realize subGCOT between Alice and Bob we carry
out the first 7 steps of the GCOT protocol of [4] in a
way that Bob cannot decide if the data comes from Alice
or from Helen if he then complains without reason he
risks to get in conflict with Helen, which would prove
him cheating.
subGCOT
2 Alice randomly picks c0, c1 from a previously agreed on code
C (for requirements on C see [4]) and commits to all bits
of the codewords, and proves that the codewords fulfil the
linear relations of C (for the zero knowledge technique used
confer [4]).
3 Bob randomly picks I0, I1 ⊂ {1, . . . ,M}, with |I0| = |I1| =
σm (σ is a parameter of the code C), I1 ∩ I0 = ∅ and sets
bi ← b for i ∈ I0 and bi ← b for i 6∈ I0.
4 Alice runs OT(ci
0
, ci
1
)(bi) with Bob (by [13] and the above
bit commitment which binds Bob to Helen and Alice) who
gets wi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. Bob tells I = I0 ∪ I1 to Alice
who opens ci
0
, ci
1
for each i ∈ I.
5 Bob checks that wi = ci
b
for i ∈ I0 and wi = cib for i ∈ I1,
sets wi ← ci
b
, for i ∈ I0 and corrects w using the code C’s
decoding algorithm, commits to wi for i ∈ {1, . . . , m}, and
proves that w1 . . . wm ∈ C.
6 All players together randomly pick a subset I2 ⊂ {1, . . . , m}
with |I2| = σm, I2 ∩ I = ∅ and opens ci0 and c
i
1
for i ∈ I2.
7 Bob proves that wi = ci
b
for i ∈ I2.
Alice and Helen play subGCOT with Bob in a way
that Alice plays via Helen using the above bit commit-
ment protocol and the forcing measurement technique
of [13] such that Bob cannot distinguish between com-
mitments/quantum states of Alice and pretended com-
mitments/quantum states of Helen, then Bob cannot des-
tinguish between the subGCOT protocols he plays with
Alice and those which are pretended by Helen. Two cases
can occur:
1. After l trials a subGCOT protocol was successful
from Alice to Bob and neither player complains.
This subGCOT protocol can be used to perform
GCOT from Alice to Bob, as all other steps of
GCOT are not critical.
2. After l trials no subGCOT protocol between Al-
ice and Bob was successfull. Then, as Helen and
Bob do not collude and Bob cannot distinguish be-
tween Alices and Helens data, it is clear that Alice
is cheating if Bob only complained about her data
and it is clear that Bob is cheating if he complained
about Helen as well as Alice.
Once Alice and Bob were able to run one round of
subGCOT they can complete this protocol to a GCOT
protocol by the steps:
8 Alice randomly picks and announces a privacy amplification
function h : {0, 1}m → {0, 1} such that a0 = h(c0) and a1 =
h(c1) and proves a0 = h(c10, . . . , c
m
0
) and a1 = h(c11, . . . , c
m
1
).
9 Bob sets a ← h(w), commits to a and proves a =
h(w1 . . . , wm).
Alice and Bob give their proofs (following the proce-
dure of [4]) in the above steps to Helen. Hence the proofs
must be correct as no one can risk to get into conflict
with Helen, also convincing Helen is enough as she is not
colluding with Alice or with Bob.
For the corectness of the GCOT protocol we refer to
the proof in [4]. We conclude:
Lemma 10 Even if Alice and Bob are in conflict
there exists an A-robust protocol for GCOT between
Alice and Helen, Bob and Helen and Alice and
Bob. This protocol becomes A˜-robust after it termi-
nated for A = {{Alice}, {Bob}, {Helen}} and A˜ =
{{Alice, Bob}, {Helen}}.
Proof: By Corollary 4 we can have oblivious transfer
from Helen to Alice and from Helen to Bob. As Helen
cannot be in conflict with Alice or Bob (or a cheater can
be identified) we can realize GCOT from Helen to any
other player by the protocols of [4] with the security of
the oblivious transfer channel of Corollary4.
The above protocol for GCOT between Alice and Bob
is still concealing for Helen even if Alice and Bob collude,
but the resulting commitments need not be binding any
more. This is no problem as we allow Alice and Bob to
collude only after the termination of the protocol (See
comment after Theorem 11). ✷
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From a bit commitment which can bind one player to
the two other players we can realize GBCX and together
with a GCOT protocol working in at least one direction
between every two players we can obtain all three party
protocols, see [4] (and [1] for creating a distributed bit
commitment, which is needed in [4], in the presence of
conflicts). Hence we can conclude:
Theorem 11 For three players Alice, Bob, and Helen
all functions can be realized by quantum multi party pro-
tocols if two players are honest. The protocol becomes
{{Alice}, {Bob}, {Helen}}∪ {A}-secure after its execu-
tion if there is a player outside of A nobody complained
about.
Note that the bit commitment used during the protocol
is not necessarily binding after Alice and Bob collude. If
one wants to implement a long binding bit commitment
one has to implement it as a multi party computation.
IV. A COMPLETENESS THEOREM FOR
QUANTUM MULTI PARTY PROTOCOLS
In the paper [11] quantum multi party protocols were
proposed which use secret sharing to force measurements
to implement oblivious transfer. Then these protocols
follow [1] to implement multi party computations with
oblivious transfer.
There was an impossibility result in [11] that quantum
multi party protocols for all functions become impossi-
ble if two possible collusions cover the set P of players.
But due to the use of oblivious transfer this had to be
weakened to the condition of Lemma 2. The impossibil-
ity result of [11] did not seem to be sharp. Now we can
prove that the result is indeed sharp as we can imple-
ment multi party protocols even in the case not covered
by [11]:
Theorem 12 A-robust quantum multi party protocols
for all functions are possible if and only if no two col-
lusions of A cover the set P of players.
These protocols become A˜-robust after termination for
an adversary structure A˜ which may contain one and
only one complement of a set of A.
Proof: If one looks at [11] one can see that the above
theorem is proven there for all cases but one. The case
left open is that two collusions A1, A2, covering P \ {Pi}
for a player Pi, are in conflict such that no player from
A1 can use the oblivious transfer to any player of A2 (and
vice versa).
In this case we can proceed analogously to our three
party protocols. All commitments are made via Pi (He-
len) and equality of commitments is proven to Helen.
This way we obtain GBCX in a way that whenever a
player complains a cheater can be identified.
The GCOT protocol can be realized analogously to
the above three party protocol. A player Alice ∈ A1 runs
subGCOT via Helen with a player Bob ∈ A2 such that
Bob cannot distinguish data from Helen and data from
Alice. Again Bob cannot complain without either being
detected cheating or proving that Alice cheats. On top
of subGCOT GCOT can easily be realized. With GBCX
and GCOT we can realize all multi party protocols [4]
if one keeps in mind that distributed bit commitments
can be realized without problems even when conflicts are
present [1].
The set A ∈ A, for which Ac may be contained in A˜,
can in the above case be chosen to be any set containing
Helen. ✷
The set A˜ can even contain more than one complement
of a set of A provided Helen is not in the additional
collusion. The protocol seems to be more secure than a
quantum protocol where no complains were present. This
is true, due to the fact that Helen becomes a trustable
third party in the way that we know she is not colluding
with anyone. This shows that conflicts appearing during
the protocol can yield additional information which can
be exploited to increase the security.
One of the ideas of this paper, namely to anonymize
oblivious transfer, can also be applied to classical proto-
cols. With the primitive of anonymous oblivious transfer
all multi party protocols become possible with perfect
security, and whenever a player tries to abort the pro-
tocol this player is identified or the protocol terminates
correctly [12].
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